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Measuring strategic control in
implicit learning: how and why?
Elisabeth Norman*
Department of Psychosocial Science, Faculty of Psychology, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Several methods have been developed for measuring the extent to which implicitly
learned knowledge can be applied in a strategic, flexible manner. Examples include
generation exclusion tasks in Serial Reaction Time (SRT) learning (Goschke, 1998;
Destrebecqz and Cleeremans, 2001) and 2-grammar classification tasks in Artificial
Grammar Learning (AGL; Dienes et al., 1995; Norman et al., 2011). Strategic control
has traditionally been used as a criterion for determining whether acquired knowledge is
conscious or unconscious, or which properties of knowledge are consciously available.
In this paper I first summarize existing methods that have been developed for measuring
strategic control in the SRT and AGL tasks. I then address some methodological and
theoretical questions. Methodological questions concern choice of task, whether the
measurement reflects inhibitory control or task switching, and whether or not strategic
control should be measured on a trial-by-trial basis. Theoretical questions concern the
rationale for including measurement of strategic control, what form of knowledge is
strategically controlled, and how strategic control can be combined with subjective
awareness measures.
Keywords: implicit learning, artificial grammar learning, serial reaction time task, strategic control, flexibility,
control, process dissociation procedure, task switching
Introduction
Strategic control over knowledge refers to whether it can be deliberately applied or withheld
according to instructions (Jacoby, 1991). In contrast, knowledge that influences behavior regardless
of the person’s intentions is considered to have an automatic influence. Strategic control is
traditionally regarded as a defining property of consciousness (Jacoby, 1991; see also Seth et al.,
2008).
Most procedures for measuring strategic control in implicit cognition have been inspired by
the Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP), which is a procedure originally developed to estimate
the relative influence of strategic versus automatic processes by comparing performance under
conditions where the person “tries to” versus “tries not to” engage in some act, referred to as
“opposition logic” (Jacoby, 1991). Measures based on the PDP are most often used to assess the
relative influence of conscious and unconscious knowledge. The aim of this paper is to address
and discuss some methodological and theoretical questions related to the measurement of strategic
control in implicit learning, where learning of complex stimulus regularities occurs in the absence
of a conscious intention to learn or full conscious awareness of the acquired knowledge. The
discussion will focus on the two most well-known implicit learning paradigms, namely the Serial
Reaction Time (SRT) task and the Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) task.
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Examples of Strategic Control
Measurement in Implicit Learning
The Serial Reaction Time Task
In the SRT task, participants are trained to make fast motor
responses to a visual target that moves between positions
on a computer screen according to a complex, pre-defined
sequence. Learning is measured in terms of reaction time
differences between target movements that follow versus violate
this sequence (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987).
Strategic control would imply that people can intentionally
apply sequence knowledge in line with instructions. One
adaptation of the PDP to sequence learning is to instruct
participants to generate a sequence that does not contain
the regularities seen during training. Goschke (1998), and
later Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001), refer to this as the
generation exclusion task. In what the same authors refer to as
the generation inclusion task participants are simply instructed
to generate a sequence that is as similar to the training
sequence as possible. If participants reproduce fewer trained
sequence regularities under exclusion than under inclusion
instructions, this is taken to indicate strategic control1. On each
trial of a cued generation task, participants are first presented
with a short sequence of, e.g., 5 (Wilkinson and Shanks,
2004) or 2 (Fu et al., 2008) elements, and then asked to
indicate a continuation response that either follows the sequence
regularity (i.e., inclusion instructions) or violates it (i.e., exclusion
instructions).
A different form of a cued generation task is the generation
rotation task (Norman et al., 2007). Stimuli are presented
in a square layout. On each trial the participant predicts
the next target position, but indicates it by rotating their
response, clockwise or anti-clockwise, in accordance with a
randomly varying post-trial cue, i.e., the numbers +1, –1, or –2.
Performance is compared to a direct version of the same task.
Mong et al. (2012) introduced an SRT procedure where all
participants learn two different sequences. Participants are then
presented with a series of short sequences that they are asked
to classify according to familiarity. Inclusion instructions are
to classify sequences as “old” if they follow either regularity.
Exclusion instructions are to classify a sequence as “old” if it
follows their target sequence, and to respond “new” if not.
The Artificial Grammar Learning Task
In the training phase of an AGL task, participants are
presented with a series of non-word letter strings in which
the selection and ordering of letters are governed by a
complex, finite-state grammar of which they are not informed
(Reber, 1967). Learning is measured as the ability to classify
novel letter strings according to grammaticality. Here, strategic
control would refer to the extent to which the person
was able to apply or withhold grammar knowledge. It
1The difference, under exclusion instructions, in the amount of trained regularities
versus regularities following an untrained sequence (i.e., baseline performance)
under exclusion instructions, can be regarded as an estimate of automatic
influence.
is typically measured in a two-grammar situation, where
participants are initially exposed to two sets of letter strings
governed by different grammars (A vs. B; Dienes et al.,
1995). On each trial of a subsequent test phase, letter
strings following these two grammars are intermixed with
ungrammatical strings, and the instruction is to classify
letter strings according to their target grammar, i.e., either
Grammar A or Grammar B.
Norman et al. (2011) referred to this as a pure-block procedure,
and developed the alternative mixed-block procedure. On each
test trial, participants are presented with three letter strings, one
ungrammatical, and one from each of two trained grammars
(A or B). Whether they are to identify A or B varies randomly
between test trials.
Higham et al.’s (2000) procedure also involves two training
phases. In the test phase, participants are presented with a list
of all test stimuli. Participants who receive so-called in-concert
instructions are asked to rate any strings consistent with either
grammar as “grammatical”, whereas those who receive opposition
instructions are asked to rate only those items consistent with
one of the grammars as grammatical, assumed to require strategic
control.
Within statistical learning2, Franco et al. (2011) have
developed a procedure where participants hear two speech
streams generated from two “artificial languages” (L1 and L2). In
a discrimination task participants are presented with words from
L1, L2, or neither. Under inclusion instructions they are to say
“yes” if the word is from either language, and under exclusion




As we see from the above examples, there is large variation in
the way strategic control has been measured with the SRT and
AGL tasks, both in terms of in which part of the experiment it is
measured, the type of judgment it involves, and whether it allows
for an independent measure of learning.
In AGL the strategic control measure is incorporated into
the classification task itself, i.e., it is measured within the same
judgment as learning. In SRT, strategic control is most often
measured in a separate generation task after the training phase is
completed. Mong et al.’s (2012) recognition task is also conducted
in a separate phase.
There is also variation in the type of judgment the strategic
control measurement requires. Whereas a recognition task
involves making a series of forced-choice judgments to the
presented sequences, a generation task requires participants to
actively produce sequence elements. Moreover, whereas free
generation requires the person to produce a long (e.g., 96
element) string of responses, each trial of a cued generation
2Statistical learning can be seen as a form of implicit learning. Even though it is
not a form of SRT or AGL, I have chosen to include it in the paper due to its
methodological relevance, and placed it in the AGL section because this particular
experiment is concerned learning of artificial languages.
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task requires one response only. This procedural variation
could in principle reduce the comparability of strategic control
measurement across different experimental paradigms and
procedures.
In SRT but not AGL it is possible to estimate learning
by RT data, independently of strategic control. This may be
relevant if one wants to analyze data only from participants
who show learning, or compare strategic control for different
degrees of learning. Even in paradigms that do not allow
for a completely independent measure of learning, it
is still possible to identify subgroups based on learning
performance. For instance, Franco et al. (2011) separated
between “low” and “high” learners based on inclusion scores.
In 2-sequence SRT tasks it may also be of interest to control
for possible differences in the amount of learning for the two
rules.
Inhibitory Control or Task Switching?
In SRT tasks there is normally only one sequence to be learned,
and strategic control is operationalized as the ability to withhold
the influence of this sequence when so instructed. In AGL
strategic control is normally studied in 2-grammar designs, a
logic which Mong et al. (2012) have applied to SRT and Franco
et al. (2011) to statistical learning.
An important question is then whether strategic control over
the application of 1 vs. 2 rules involves the same or different
mechanisms. This relates to the distinction between inhibition
and task switching. Within working memory research, the two
are most often seen as distinguishable executive components
(Baddeley, 1996), that may even be inversely related at the level of
the individual (Friedman et al., 2011). More specifically, whereas
task switching may depend on the ability to clear working
memory contents and prior goals when a task changes, inhibition
may involve motor response inhibition and/or interference
control (Blackwell et al. (2014). Therefore, one cannot rule out the
possibility that the ability to flexibly apply two implicitly learned
rules may reflect a different form or degree of cognitive control
than the ability to inhibit the influence of one implicitly learned
rule.
Global vs. Trial-by-trial Measurement
Some would argue that the ability to deliberately apply or
withhold information according to instructions also implies
being able to comply with shifting instructions. This would be
in line with Baars’s (1988) global workspace model, where the
ability to apply knowledge in a contextually flexible way is seen
as indicative of consciousness. However, traditional exclusion
procedures in SRT, and pure-block classification procedures
in AGL, both require participants to comply with the same
instruction throughout the task. Similarly, in Higham et al.’s
(2000) classification procedure the task set is identical across
all test items. It could be argued that successful performance
in such settings merely requires a global voluntary inhibition
of the influence of acquired knowledge rather than a moment-
to-moment ability to control the application of this knowledge.
An alternative would be to let the instruction change between
individual trials, as in the rotation task in the SRT task (Norman
et al., 2007) or the mixed-block procedure in AGL (Norman
et al., 2011). Alternating the SRT stimulus-response mapping
or the AGL target grammar from test trial to test trial could
be seen as a more demanding test of strategic control than
instructing participants to activate one mental set and inhibit
another at the start of a block of trials. In the task switching
literature (Monsell, 2003), the mixing cost refers to the difference
in performance between blocks of trials where participants apply
the same task set across several trials, and mixed blocks, where
participants are instructed to alternate between which of n
rules to apply. Whereas a single task can be executed quite
automatically, alternating between multiple tasks, each involving
a different instruction, is assumed to demand more executive
control.
Theoretical Questions
What does Strategic Control Imply?
Traditionally strategic control has been regarded as a criterion
for deciding whether or not knowledge is consciously available
(e.g., Wilkinson and Shanks, 2004). It can also be used to identify
the conditions under which learning is associated with more
conscious or unconscious knowledge. For instance, Destrebecqz
and Cleeremans (2001) reported that participants could exclude
under certain response-stimulus intervals but not others, and
Franco et al. (2011) found exclusion performance to depend on
the individual’s level of learning. Similarly, in Fu et al. (2008)
study, providing participants with a reward incentive increased
exclusion performance.
Others have used strategic control as one of several measures
to assess the properties of different types of knowledge assumed
to result from implicit learning. For example, strategic control
has been combined with other measures in order to identify
knowledge states that correspond to fringe consciousness, defined
as consciously available feelings that occur in relationship to
unconscious knowledge (Norman et al., 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011).
In a context where the nature of the rule is made less salient,
e.g., by introducing random variation in irrelevant stimulus
properties from one stimulus to the next, some participants may
develop incorrect hypotheses about the nature of the rule. For
instance, they may report that they think target positions in
SRT were predicted by color combinations rather than previous
target positions. If these unaware participants nevertheless show
strategic control over the sequence (e.g., on a generation rotation
task), this could be taken to indicate that they have conscious
access to a feeling that reflects unconscious knowledge of the
sequence. A similar logic may be applied to AGL (see Norman
et al., 2011).
Similarly,Wan et al. (2008) looked at whether strategic control
in AGL differed depending on the extent to which judgment
knowledge of whether a certain string follows the grammatical
structure, versus structural knowledge of the grammar rules, were
conscious of unconscious (see Dienes and Scott, 2005, for an
introduction to this distinction and related self-report measures).
Significant strategic control was found even for trials attributed
to strategies not involving conscious structural knowledge, i.e.,
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familiarity, intuition, and random choice. Similarly, Fu et al.
(2010) found successful exclusion performance on generation
trials that were attributed to intuition, rules, and memory, but
not to random choice. Whereas intuition is assumed to involve
conscious judgment knowledge but not conscious structural
knowledge, rules and memory attributions are taken to indicate
that both forms of knowledge are conscious (Dienes and Scott,
2005). Fu et al. (2010) therefore took this result to indicate that
strategic control can be based on both conscious and unconscious
structural knowledge. Here, we see that measurement of
strategic control, when complemented with subjective awareness
measures, can contribute to a more detailed understanding of
the subtypes of knowledge acquired in implicit learning and their
properties.
Strategic Control Over What?
A related question is what kind of knowledge or signal people are
strategically controling in implicit learning situations.
One possibility is that people are strategically controling
grammar/sequence knowledge itself. Following Baars (1988)
and Jacoby (1991), strategic control could then be taken to
indicate that learning is fully conscious. However, recent studies
within other areas of implicit cognition have provided evidence
suggesting that unconscious knowledge can be strategically
applied (Lau and Passingham, 2007; Schmidt et al., 2007; van
Gaal et al., 2010; van Gaal and Lamme, 2012). The question
then is whether and in what way unconscious knowledge may be
associated with strategic control.
Within the fringe consciousness framework (Norman et al.,
2006, 2007, 2011) it could be argued that what participants
are strategically controling is a feeling that reflects knowledge
of the underlying rule, even if this knowledge is not itself
consciously represented. In SRT, such feelings could take the
form of certain positions “feeling right”, and in AGL of
certain letter strings feeling more familiar or coherent than
others. If such feelings can be used flexibly in accordance
with shifting task demands this could be taken to indicate
that the feeling itself, rather than the underlying knowledge of
the learned structure, is conscious. In terms of the judgment
vs. structural knowledge distinction (Dienes and Scott, 2005),
“unconscious control” could be understood as occuring when
people are not conscious of structural properties of the
grammar or sequence. In such situations they may still be
conscious of whether they think a string is familiar or not, or
whether it feels like their generation responses comply with the
sequence.
Strategic Control and Subjective Awareness
Measures
Even though strategic control is traditionally regarded as a
criterion for deciding whether acquired knowledge is conscious
or not, it has been argued that strategic control used as a sole
measure of consciousness may lead to a distorted picture of what
people are consciously aware of in implicit learning, as pointed
out by Gaillard et al. (2014):
“. . . defining consciousness as the ability to exert intentional
control over the acquired knowledge fails, however, to capture
one of its essential aspects, that is, the qualitative, subjective or
first-order properties of conscious experience.” (ibid., p. 53).
The importance of supplementing measurement of strategic
control with subjective awareness measures also follows from the
theoretical perspectives presented above, in which consciously
experienced, fringe feelings are seen to reflect unconscious
rule knowledge, or implicit learning is hypothesized to give
rise to different forms of knowledge that may converge or
dissociate in terms of consciousness. For example, in order to
establish that knowledge corresponds to fringe consciousness,
one needs systematic ways of measuring people’s degree
of rule awareness (Norman et al., 2007, 2011). To assess
whether judgment vs. structural knowledge is conscious or
unconscious, self-reported decision strategy judgments can
be collected for every classification or generation response
(Dienes and Scott, 2005; Scott and Dienes, 2008). Other
awareness measures include confidence ratings (Norman
and Price, 2015), recognition ratings (Destrebecqz and
Cleeremans, 2001), and post-decision wagering (Wierzchon et al.,
2012).
An additional way in which subjective awareness measures
can be applied is to assess people’s metacognitive awareness of
their degree of strategic control. For example, Destrebecqz and
Cleeremans (2003) found that participants were more confident
in exclusion than inclusion performance, that confidence was
related to accuracy only for inclusion, and only in the highest
RSI condition. Similarly, Norman et al. (2007) found a tendency
for confidence to more accurately reflect accuracy on rotation
than direct generation. Thus, this form of measurement may
be used to start exploring to what extent participants have
metacognitive insight into their flexible application of rules that
are in themselves not necessarily conscious (see alsoMealor et al.,
2014).
Conclusion
I have outlined how strategic control measurement can
provide us with a better understanding of the properties of
knowledge acquired through implicit learning, and I have
pointed to some methodological and theoretical considerations
that researchers should take into account. Importantly, I
have argued that strategic control may be applied not only
over conscious sequence/grammar knowledge, but also over
conscious feelings that relate to acquired knowledge that
in itself is not consciously accessible. Therefore measures
of strategic control should not be considered as awareness
measures per se but should be complemented with subjective
measures.
A better understanding of how and to what extent implicitly
learned knowledge can be strategically controlled may provide
an important contribution to our knowledge of implicit learning,
our knowledge on consciousness more generally and finally, to
our understanding of how implicitly learned knowledge may
influence behavior in everyday situations (Norman and Price,
2012).
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